UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATHENS DIVISION

BASF AGRO B.V., MERIAL LIMITED, and MERIAL SAS

Plaintiffs,

Civil Case No. 3:07-cv-00125-CDL

v.

CIPLA LIMITED, et al.,

Defendants, and

VELCERA, INC. and FIDOPHARM, INC.

Intervenors.

EXHIBIT 3

TO VELCERA'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPPOSING MERIAL'S CONTEMPT MOTION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATHENS DIVISION

BASF AGRO B.V.; MERIAL LIMITED; and MERIAL SAS,	
Plaintiffs,	
vs.	
CIPLA LIMITED; PETMEDS R US; GENERIC PETMEDS; PETCARE PHARMACY; ARCHIPELAGO SUPPLIERS; ARROWTARGET ENTERPRISES, LTD; INHOUSE DRUGSTORE; and LISA PERKO,	CIVIL ACTION NO 3:07-CV-00125
	MAY 16, 2011
	MOTION HEARING
Defendants,	VOLUME I OF II
and	
VELCERA, INC., and FIDOPHARM, INC.	
Intervenors.	

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE THE HONORABLE CLAY D. LAND,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography; transcript produced by computer.

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have moved for a preliminary injunction. We have a preexisting patent infringement action in the district court in Delaware, where they have counterclaimed --THE COURT: This is not a patent infringement action, as I see it. I understand it's related. But what I see them asking for is that you — I'm not saying you did. I'm just saying the way I've read the briefs that everybody has filed is that you aided CIPLA in the violation of this Court's previous injunction; and therefore, they were coming in today -- what I thought -- to prove that CIPLA violated the injunction and that you aided and abetted them in violating the injunction and that their hope was to convince me of that; and if they did, then they were seeking as their relief today for me to take whatever remedy was necessary to remediate your violation of the injunction and your aiding and abetting of the violation of the injunction. Whether we want to call that a preliminary injunction or not, when you read the papers, that's clearly what they were seeking. And whether that would be done in an order preliminary in nature, such that I would -- if I found in their favor, I would say until we have a final final hearing on the merits, you're prevented from doing all those things, or whether today was the final trial, clearly all the parties should have known that they should be prepared to defend against what they were seeking. And all I want to do is get

seemed to say aiding and abetting.

MR. GRAVES: But the new theory they introduced on Friday night — and it's in this reply brief that I was just served with 15 minutes ago, before we started these proceedings — it's an induced infringement theory under 271(b) of the patent —

THE COURT: But isn't their induced infringement theory factually substantially the same as their aiding and abetting and their — maybe it's not. But factual — and I understand legally the standard may be different. But as I understand it, they have asserted that CIPLA — and by addressing all this to you, I'm not suggesting that I'm accepting what they're saying or not. I'm just trying to — I want to get down to the nut of the issue. And I just want to make sure that we're able to do that.

But my understanding is, the plaintiffs' theory is that CIPLA — and we're going to get into jurisdiction and all that; we'll address all that — but that CIPLA was ordered through an injunction that they could not sell this product in the United States or cause it to be sold in the United States and that the plaintiffs' contention is that the product that was the subject of that injunction is now being sold in the United States, because CIPLA has done an end run — this is what I understand their theory to be — has done an end run around the Court's injunction, knowing that they could not

1 directly sell the product in the United States and comply with 2 the Court's injunction; that CIPLA has done this end run, where 3 they've gotten together with Velcera and have gotten Velcera to 4 assist and aid and abet them to do exactly what they couldn't 5 do directly; and that because of that, Velcera, having 6 knowledge of the injunction and having knowledge of it, 7 knowingly assisted them in violating the injunction, either 8 because they acted in concert with, or they aided and abetted, 9 or because they induced them to violate the patent which was 10 the subject of the order. 11 Now, I don't envision us today getting into the 12 legitimacy — I may be wrong; somebody could show me why it's 13 relevant -- the legitimacy of the underlying patent at this 14 point. The way I see it, it's whether -- it's the injunction. 15 It's whether CIPLA violated it. And then it's whether Velcera 16 aided and abetted or acted in concert to allow CIPLA to violate 17 it. 18 Now, this extra theory on inducement, maybe there's 19 some aspects of that that go to the validity of the patent that 20 maybe you may not be prepared to go into today, but I can't see 21 how you would not be prepared to address with evidence the 22 issue of what you did, if anything, to aid and abet or act in 23 concert with CIPLA to violate the patent. 24 MR. GRAVES: We --25 THE COURT: Or to violate the order, not the patent